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Acronyms
2
Acronym Definition 
COTS Commercial off the Shelf
EDAC Error Detection and Correction
EEE Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
I/O Input/Output Operating System
LEO Low Earth Orbit
POF Physics of Failure
Rad Hard Radiation Hardened
SOC System on a Chip
SwaP Size, Weight, and Power
TID Total Ionizing Dose
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Abstract
 As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a 
lower cost model of development and operation via 
concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft 
(aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and 
qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-
reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic 
concepts will be discussed:
 The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods 
to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; 
and,
 A discussion of “over-design” focusing on both electrical design 
performance and bounding margins.
 Example scenarios will be described as well as 
consideration for trading traditional versus alternate 
methods.
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Outline
• The Changing Space Market
– Commercial Space and “Small” Space
• EEE Parts Assurance
• Modern Electronics
– Magpie Syndrome
• Breaking Tradition: Alternate Approaches
– Higher Assembly Level Tests
– Use of Fault Tolerance
• Mission Risk and EEE Parts
• Summary
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Space Missions:
How Our Frontiers Have Changed
• Cost constraints and cost “effectiveness” have 
led to dramatic shifts away from traditional large-
scale missions (ex., Hubble Space Telescope).
• Two prime trends have surfaced:
– Commercial space ventures where the procuring agent 
“buys” a service or data product and the implementer is 
responsible for ensuring mission success with limited 
agent oversight. And,
– Small missions such as CubeSats that are allowed to 
take higher risks based on mission purpose and cost.
• These trends are driving the usage of non 
Mil/Aero parts such as Automotive grade (see 
Mike Sampson’s talk) and “architectural 
reliability” approaches.
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EEE Parts Assurance
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Assurance for EEE Parts
• Assurance is
– Knowledge of
• The supply chain and manufacturer of the product, 
• The manufacturing process and its controls, and,
• The physics of failure (POF) related to the technology.
– Statistical process and inspection via
• Testing, inspection, physical analyses and modeling.
– Understanding the application and environmental 
conditions for device usage.
• This includes:
– Radiation,
– Lifetime,
– Temperature,
– Vacuum, etc., as well as,
– Device application and appropriate derating criteria.
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Reliability and Availability
• Reliability (Wikipedia)
– The ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of 
time.
• Will it work for as long as you need?
• Availability (Wikipedia)
– The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is in 
a specified operable and committable state at the start of a 
mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e., a 
random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time 
a system is in a functioning condition. This is often described 
as a mission capable rate.
• Will it be available when you need it to work?
• Combining the two drives mission requirements:
– Will it work for as long as and when you need it to?
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What does this mean for EEE parts?
• The more understanding you 
have of a device’s failure modes 
and causes, the higher the 
confidence level that it will 
perform under mission 
environments and lifetime
– High confidence = “it has to work”
• High confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
– Less confidence = “it may to work”
• Less confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
• It may work, but prior to flight there 
is less certainty.
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Traditional Approach to Confidence
• Part level qualification
– Qualification processes are designed to statistically 
understand/remove known reliability risks and uncover 
other unknown risks inherent in a part.
• Requires significant sample size and comprehensive suite 
of piecepart testing (insight) – high confidence method
• Part level screening
– Electronic component screening uses environmental 
stressing and electrical testing to identify marginal and 
defective components within a procured lot of EEE parts.
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However, tradition doesn’t match the 
changing space market and alternate EEE 
parts approaches that may be
“good enough”
are being used.
(Discussed later in presentation.)
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Modern Electronics
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The Magpie Syndrome:
The Electrical Designer’s Dilemma
• Magpie’s are known for being attracted to bright, 
shiny things.
• In many ways, the modern electrical engineer is a 
Magpie:
– They are attracted to the latest state-of-the-art devices 
and EEE parts technologies.
• These can be any grade of EEE parts that aren’t qualified 
for space nor radiation hardened.
– These bright and shiny parts may have very attractive 
performance features that aren’t available in higher-
reliability parts:
• Size, weight, and power (SwaP),
• Integrated functionality,
• Speed of data collection/transfer,
• Processing capability, etc…
13
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at 2016 SERESSA 12th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems 
for Space Applications, Montreal, Canada, November 7-10, 2016.
When Should a Magpie Fly?
• While not designed for usage in the harsh environs of 
space, there are still multiple scenarios where usage of 
Magpies may be considered:
– Mil/Aero alternatives are not available,
• Ex., SWaP or functionality or procurement schedule,
– A mission has a relatively short lifetime or benign space 
environment exposure,
• Ex., 6 month CubeSat mission in LEO,
– A system can assume possible unknown risks,
• Ex., technology demonstration mission,
– Device upscreening (per mission requirements) and system 
validation are performed to obtain confidence in usage,
– System level assurances based on fault tolerance and higher 
assembly level test and validation are deemed sufficient.
• This is a systems engineering trade that takes a multi-disciplinary 
review.
– Or maybe as a pathfinder for future usage.
• Out of scope for this talk: use of flight data for “qualification”.
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Magpie Constraints
• But Magpies aren’t designed for space flight (just 
some aviary aviation at best)!
• Sample differences include:
– Temperature ranges,
– Vacuum performance,
– Shock and vibration,
– Lifetime, and
– Radiation tolerance.
• Traditionally, “upscreening” at the part level has 
occurred.
– Definition: A means of assessing a portion of the inherent 
reliability of a device via test and analysis.
• Note: Discovery of a upscreened part failure occurs 
regularly.
• The following charts discuss alternate approaches.
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Breaking Tradition: Alternate Approaches
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Assembly Testing:
Can it Replace Testing at the Parts Level?
We can test devices,
but how do we test systems?
Or better yet, systems of 
systems on a chip (SOC)?
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Not All Assemblies are Equal
• Consider assemblies having two distinct categories
– Off the shelf (you get what you get) such as COTS, and,
– Custom (possibility of having “design for test” included”)
• Still won’t be as complete as single part level testing, but it 
does reduce some challenges.
• For COTS assemblies, some of the specific concerns 
are: 
– Bill-of-materials may not include lot date codes or device 
manufacturer information.
– Individual part application may not be known or datasheet 
unavailable.
– The possible variances for “copies” of the “same” assembly:
• Form, fit, and function EEE parts may mean various 
manufacturers, or, 
• Lot-to-lot and even device-to-device differences in 
reliability/availability.
18
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at 2016 SERESSA 12th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems 
for Space Applications, Montreal, Canada, November 7-10, 2016.
Sample Challenges for
Testing Assemblies
• Limited statistics versus part level approaches due to sample size.
• Inspection constraints.
• Acceleration factors
– Temperature testing limited to “weakest” part.
– Voltage testing may be limited by on-board/on-chip power regulation.
• Limited test points and I/O challenge adequate stress data capture.
• Ensuring adequate fault coverage testing.
• Visibility of errors/failures/faults due to limited I/O availability.
• System operation.
– Ex., Using nominal flight software versus a high stress test approach.
• Error propagation
– An error occurs but does not propagate outward until some time later 
due to system operations such as those of an interrupt register.
• Fault masking during radiation exposure
– Too high a particle rate or too many devices being exposed 
simultaneously.
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Using Fault Tolerance
• Making a system more “reliable/available” can occur at many 
levels
– Operational
• Ex., no operation in the South Atlantic Anomaly (proton hazard)
– System
• Ex., redundant boxes/busses or swarms of nanosats
– Circuit/software
• Ex., error detection and correction (EDAC) scrubbing of memory 
devices by an external device or processor
– Device (part)
• Ex., triple-modular redundancy (TMR) of internal logic within the device
– Transistor
• Ex., use of annular transistors for TID improvement
– Material
• Ex., addition of an epi substrate to reduce SEE charge collection (or 
other substrate engineering)
Good engineers can invent infinite solutions,
but the solution used must be adequately validated.
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at 2016 SERESSA 12th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems 
for Space Applications, Montreal, Canada, November 7-10, 2016. 21
Example: 
Is Radiation Testing Always Required for COTS?
• Exceptions for testing may include
– Operational
• Ex., The device is only powered on once per orbit and the 
sensitive time window for a single event effect is minimal
– Acceptable data loss
• Ex., System level error rate (availability) may be set such that 
data is gathered 95% of the time.
– Given physical device volume and assuming every ion causes 
an upset, this worst-case rate may be tractable.
– Negligible effect
• Ex., A 2 week mission on a shuttle may have a very low Total 
Ionizing Dose (TID) requirement.
A flash memory may be acceptable 
without testing if a low TID 
requirement exists or not powered on 
for the large majority of time.
Memory picture courtesy
NASA/GSFC, Code 561
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Is knowledge of EEE Parts Failure Modes
Required To Build a Fault Tolerant System?
• The system may work, but do we have adequate 
confidence in the system to have adequate 
reliability and availability prior to launch?
– What are the “unknown unknowns”?
• Can we account for them?
– How do you calculate risk with unscreened/untested 
EEE parts?
– Do you have a common mode failure potential in your 
design? 
• I.e., a design with identical redundant strings rather than 
having independent redundant strings.
– How do you adequately validate a fault tolerant system 
for space?
• This is a critical point.
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Bottom Line on
Assembly Testing and Fault Tolerance
• While clearly ANY testing is better 
than none, assembly testing has 
limitations compared to the individual 
EEE part level.
– This is a risk-trade that’s still to be 
understood.
– No definitive study exists comparing this 
approach versus traditional parts 
qualification and screening.
• Fault tolerance needs to be validated.
– Understanding the fault and failure 
signatures is required to design 
appropriate tolerance.
– The more complex the system, the harder 
the validation is.
23
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at 2016 SERESSA 12th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems 
for Space Applications, Montreal, Canada, November 7-10, 2016. 24
Mission Risk and EEE Parts
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Understanding Risk
• The risk management requirements 
may be broken into three 
considerations
– Technical/Design – “The Good”
• Relate to the circuit designs not being able to 
meet mission criteria such as jitter related to a 
long dwell time of a telescope on an object
– Programmatic – “The Bad”
• Relate to a mission missing a launch window or 
exceeding a budgetary cost cap which can lead to 
mission cancellation
– Radiation/Reliability – “The Ugly”
• Relate to mission meeting its lifetime and 
performance goals without premature failures or 
unexpected anomalies
• Each mission must determine its priorities 
among the three risk types
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Background: Traditional Risk Matrix
Risk Tolerance Boundary
Placed on the profile to reflect
Corporate “Risk Appetite”
Caution Zone
Risks in the “yellow” area
need constant vigilance
and regular audit
By adjusting the level of
currency hedging, resources
can be released to help fund
improvements to protection of
the production facility.
Likelihood Scale: A: Very High B: High C: Occasional D: Low E: Very Low F: Almost Impossible
Impact Scale: I: Catastrophic II: Critical III: Significant IV: Marginal
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Space Missions:
EEE Parts and Risk
• The determination of acceptability for device 
usage is a complex trade space.
– Every engineer will “solve” a problem differently:
• Ex., software versus hardware solutions.
• The following chart proposes an alternate 
mission risk matrix approach for EEE parts 
based on:
– Environment exposure,
– Mission lifetime, and,
– Criticality of implemented function.
• Notes:
– “COTS” implies any grade that is not space qualified 
and radiation hardened.
– Level 1 and 2 refer to traditional space qualified EEE 
parts.
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Notional EEE Parts Selection Factors
High Level 1 or 2 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad hard 
suggested. 
Full upscreening for 
COTS. 
Fault tolerant designs 
for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad 
hard 
recommended. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Medium COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested 
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended. 
Fault-tolerance 
recommended
Level 1 or 2, rad
hard suggested. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Low COTS upscreening/
testing optional. 
Do no harm (to 
others)
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested. 
Do no harm (to others)
Rad hard 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerance 
recommended
Low Medium High
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A Few Details on the “Matrix”
• When to test:
– “Optional”
• Implies that you might get away without this, but there’s residual risk.
– “Suggested”
• Implies that it is good idea to do this, and likely some risk if you don’t. 
– “Recommended”
• Implies that this really should be done or you’ll definitely have some 
risk.
– Where just the item is listed (like “full upscreening for COTS”) 
• This should be done to meet the criticality and environment/lifetime 
concerns.
• The higher the level of risk acceptance by a mission, the higher 
the consideration for performing alternate assembly level testing 
versus traditional part level.
• All fault tolerance must be validated.
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Good mission planning identifies where on the matrix a EEE part lies.
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Summary
• In this talk, we have presented:
– An overview of considerations for alternate EEE parts 
approaches:
• Technical, programmatic, and risk-oriented
– Every mission views the relative priorities differently.
• As seen below, every decision type may have a 
process.
– It’s all in developing an appropriate one for your 
application and avoiding “buyer’s remorse”!
